Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 37

11-1-2004

Ethics2: The Ethics of Bioethics in the Biotechnology Industry
Annette E. Clark

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj

Recommended Citation
Clark, Annette E. (2004) "Ethics2: The Ethics of Bioethics in the Biotechnology Industry," Seattle Journal
for Social Justice: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 37.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol3/iss1/37

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

311

Ethics2: The Ethics of Bioethics in the
Biotechnology Industry
Annette E. Clark1
I. Introduction ...................................................................... 312
II. Why Bioethics? ............................................................... 313
A. Bioethics Defined........................................................ 313
B. Human Stem Cell Research......................................... 315
III. Private Ethics Advisory Boards ..................................... 317
A. The Geron Experience ................................................ 318
B. The Advanced Cell Therapeutics Experience ............. 320
IV. Bioethics in the Boardroom ........................................... 321
A. Corporate Motivation.................................................. 322
B. Structural Aspects of the Bioethicist-Corporate
Relationship ...................................................................... 323
1. Objectivity and Independence.................................. 323
a. Membership Criteria ............................................ 323
b. Uniform Standards ............................................... 325
c. Financial Relationship.......................................... 325
2. Timing...................................................................... 326
3. Corporate Accountability......................................... 328
4. Transparency............................................................ 329
C. The Ethical Crisis Within the Bioethics Profession .... 330
1. Working from Within .............................................. 331
2. Standing Above the Fray ......................................... 332
D. Corporate Responsibility in the Realm of Bioethics... 333
V. Conclusion ...................................................................... 336

312 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

I. INTRODUCTION
Medical and scientific research today is being driven by private, forprofit biotechnology corporations, either acting alone or through
collaboration with academic institutions in the form of large medicalindustrial complexes. This alignment of the scientific academy with
corporate capital is reaping enormous scientific dividends, with the
potential for equally enormous financial gain. In fact, the linking of
academic institutions and the scientific imperative2 with the financial capital
and profit motivations of the corporate sector has created something of a
perfect storm.
The public has been assailed over the last several years with news of
scientific breakthroughs regarding stem cell technology, therapeutic
cloning, and reproductive cloning. The speed at which these developments
have occurred has been awe inspiring, but also somewhat alarming if one
believes, as I do, in the importance of reasoned, thoughtful discourse on this
kind of research and its implications for society. If the research directions
and decisions are being determined within the private boardrooms of
corporate America (and the world), one might reasonably ask whether the
wealth of bioethics literature, the public discussions, the presidential
bioethics commissions, and the national advisory boards are having any
impact at all on that decision making. In other words, is there room for
bioethics discourse in the boardroom? If so, who will initiate it? How
would a private, for-profit corporation create an ethical climate for decision
making that welcomes and takes into account bioethics theories and
principles?
Perhaps because I teach Bioethics and the Law, Professor Lynne Dallas’s
work on ethics and corporate climate3 started me thinking about the
application of her theoretical approach to this realm of bioethics. More
specifically, I wondered how this kind of analysis might be applied to that
of the biotechnology industry and the medical research enterprise, a setting
that is a step removed from the direct delivery of health care services.
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Given the enormous financial and scientific incentives at play, it seems a
timely and potentially fruitful enterprise to apply the lens of corporate
theory to bioethics decision making within this sector.
This article begins in Part II with a brief description of bioethics as a
discipline, with particular emphasis on the role of bioethics discourse and
discussion in the current societal debate over human stem cell research and
therapeutic cloning. Part III examines the trend within the biotechnology
industry of utilizing private ethics advisory boards as a mechanism for
incorporating bioethics analysis into the corporate decision-making process,
with a focus on corporate stem cell research. Part IV then explores the
structural components of corporate bioethics consultation, the identity crisis
that this form of consultation has created within the field of bioethics, and
the extent to which these attempts to bring bioethics into the corporate
boardroom have been effective in creating a “bioethical climate” for
decision making. The article concludes with the assertion that the
biotechnology industry, in the highly contested realms of human stem cell
and embryo research, bears a corporate responsibility to integrate bioethical
analysis and discourse into its decision-making processes.

II. WHY BIOETHICS?
A. Bioethics Defined
Bioethics is a field of academic study that originated in the 1970s,4 and is
defined as the “systematic study of the moral dimensions—including moral
vision, decisions, conduct, and policies—of the life sciences and health
care, employing a variety of ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary
setting.”5 Although once focused on principle-based ethical analysis
(autonomy, beneficence, distributive justice), the field of bioethics has
greatly expanded its repertoire to include narrative bioethics, critical race
and feminist perspectives, Aristotelian virtue bioethics, ethics of caring, and
theories founded on religion, casuistry,6 pragmatism, and even law and

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

313

314 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

economics. Those who practice the art of bioethics show a similar
diversity, coming from the ranks of philosophers, theologians, physicians,
nurses, and lawyers. Although on-the-job training with hospital ethics
committees and research review boards once was the norm, many
bioethicists now hold graduate degrees in the subject.7
Bioethics as a discipline has come of age in the past decade or so, and its
practitioners have become prominent and influential players in the public
policy arena. Clinical and academic bioethicists, who hold staff positions
within hospitals and tenured faculty positions within university-affiliated
bioethics centers, are increasingly a force to be reckoned with as they opine
to the media on virtually a daily basis, advise the president and the
administration through membership on influential governmental bioethics
commissions, and provide expert testimony at congressional hearings on
bioethics matters. In fact, critics accuse the bioethics profession of having
anointed its members as society’s “philosopher-kings.”8
Why has society been so eager to turn to these self-appointed experts?
Although the reasons are undoubtedly complex, and far beyond the scope of
this article, one reason stands out: scientific advancements have forced us to
confront novel issues, and we have turned to bioethics to help us make
sense of this brave new world where everything (physical appearance, life
span, genetic composition, even death itself) seems subject to alteration and
manipulation. Thus, the field of bioethics has been at the forefront on such
issues as the right to die, physician-assisted death, abortion, human
experimentation, organ donation and transplantation, genetic manipulation,
and most recently, human stem cell research, and cloning. These latter two
topics, stem cell research and the cloning of human embryos, have
embroiled scientists, government officials, the biotechnology industry,
bioethicists, and the general public in an intense debate over the ethics of
research on human embryos, with some seeking an outright ban and others
seeking to accelerate the rate at which this type of research advances.
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B. Human Stem Cell Research
Human stem cells are extraordinary cells in that they are pluripotent,
meaning that they have the capacity, under the right circumstances, to
develop into any type of cell (blood, heart, muscle, liver, kidney, etc.).
Although stem cells can be isolated in adults,9 the most promising source is
the very early embryo, more accurately termed a blastocyst. In early
embryological development, these stem cells begin to migrate and
eventually differentiate and develop into all of the tissues and organs of the
human body.10
The scientific potential for human stem cells is enormous—stem cells
could theoretically be coaxed to differentiate into brain cells to cure
Parkinson’s disease or repair a quadriplegic’s severed spinal cord, into
insulin cells to cure diabetes or heart muscle to replace tissue damaged by a
heart attack. However, because extracting the stem cells requires
destruction of the human embryo, their medical and scientific promise has
run afoul of the right to life debate. In 1996, Congress had passed an
amendment (the Dickey Amendment) to an appropriations bill for the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) that banned any federal funding for
research in which human embryos were damaged or destroyed.11 The goal
was to slow down or stop this kind of research; however, the result was just
the opposite because embryo research did not stop—it just moved to the
private sector, where it was and is still completely unfettered by
governmental control.
In 1998, scientists working in the private sector announced that they had
successfully extracted stem cells from human embryos and cultured them
into stem cell lines, which could then be used for experimentation.12 This
announcement caused quite a public stir, prompting President Clinton to ask
his National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to prepare a report
on stem cell research.13 In 1999, NBAC issued a report that supported
federal funding for stem cell research using embryos already in existence
(for example, spare embryos donated by individuals undergoing in vitro
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fertilization), but not for research involving embryos that were created
specifically for the purpose of stem cell extraction.14
In the meantime, the NIH, which had opposed the amendment banning
federal funding for human embryo research, decided to try an end run
around it. The NIH obtained a legal opinion from the Department of Health
and Human Services that stated that although the amendment prohibited the
NIH from funding research that directly created or destroyed human
embryos, the NIH could fund research on embryonic stem cells extracted
from embryos that had been destroyed by someone else.15 Based on this
somewhat strained interpretation, the NIH proceeded to publish guidelines
in August of 2000 for federally funded embryonic stem cell research.
However, before the guidelines could be implemented, the 2000 presidential
election resulted in a change in administration and a shift in stem cell
politics.
In April 2001, Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G.
Thompson ordered a halt to the NIH review of funding proposals so that the
administration could review the issue, which effectively blocked the NIH
from providing federal funds for stem cell research.16 A few months later,
President Bush announced that he would allow limited federal funding for
stem cell research, but only if the researchers used stem cell lines17 already
in existence as of August 9, 2001.18 He subsequently created his own
bioethics commission, the President’s Council on Bioethics, and asked for a
report on the ethics and science of human cloning and stem cell research.19
After six months of study and debate, a divided council produced a report in
July 2002 that called for a four-year moratorium on the cloning of human
embryos, but declined to recommend a permanent ban, disappointing the
White House and conservative groups.20 Since then, numerous attempts to
pass a federal ban on all cloning activities have failed to make it through
Congress.
Despite all of the twists and turns on this issue in the public sector,
privately funded embryo and stem cell research has continued unabated.
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One of the issues that has arisen is how to prevent a person’s immune
system from rejecting the “foreign” cells and tissues that might be derived
from embryonic stem cells. Scientists funded by a company called
Advanced Cell Therapeutics (ACT) hit upon human embryonic cloning as a
way around this problem.21 Simply put, they extracted the nucleus of a
somatic cell from an adult (for example, scrapings of cheek cells from
inside the mouth) and injected it into an egg from which they had removed
the nucleus. By using chemical or electrical stimulation, scientists were
able to stimulate this cell to start dividing, producing a blastocyst or early
embryo that was the identical genetic clone of the adult who had donated
the somatic cell. The theory was that stem cells extracted from this cloned
embryo would not be rejected by the immune system of the adult who, for
example, needed new heart tissue or new insulin-producing cells. This
process was termed “therapeutic cloning,” or more precisely, somatic cell
nuclear transfer.
When word got out on what ACT had done, all hell broke loose. In
addition to the ethical issues posed by the creation of embryos to destroy
them and the manipulation of human genetic material through somatic cell
nuclear transfer, people were concerned that this work might lead to
“reproductive cloning,” in which the resultant cloned embryos were actually
transferred to a woman’s uterus and brought to term. It is a brave new
world, indeed.
These scientific developments, the corresponding ethical issues they have
raised,22 and the rather anomalous lack of regulatory control over privately
funded embryo and stem cell research within the biotechnology sector, have
led to an interesting phenomenon in which some members of the industry
have voluntarily sought to bring bioethics into their boardrooms.

III. PRIVATE ETHICS ADVISORY BOARDS
The private ethics advisory board is one of the emerging mechanisms
being used by corporations to import bioethics analysis into the
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biotechnology industry.
Geron Corporation and Advanced Cell
Therapeutics are two of the many companies that have instituted private
ethics advisory boards, and their experiences provide useful case studies
through which to examine the benefits and problems associated with
bringing bioethics into the corporate boardroom. These case studies raise
important questions as to whether the use of private ethics consultation is a
genuine corporate effort to bring societal values and concerns to bear on
contested areas of scientific research, or whether bioethicists are being coopted and used in the pursuit of corporate profits.
A. The Geron Experience
Geron Corporation, a publicly held biotechnology enterprise located in
Menlo Park, California, has been at the forefront of research involving
human stem cells. Its founder, Michael West, has variously been described
as a “merchant of immortality,”23 “a headstrong provocateur,”24 and “a
corporate, religious, scientific P.T. Barnum.”25 In his quest to develop
replaceable cells and tissues to combat the aging process, West realized
early on the tremendous potential of human stem cell research. In the kind
of collaborative arrangement between private industry and the scientific
academy that is so common today, Geron signed agreements with James
Thomson, a scientist at the University of Wisconsin, and John Gearhart, a
scientist at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, to fund their work with
embryonic and fetal stem cells.26 As a result of Thomson’s and Gearhart’s
efforts, Geron announced on November 5, 1998, that its teams of scientists
had succeeded in establishing cell culture lines of human embryonic stem
cells.27 This breakthrough had tremendous scientific implications, but it
also raised profound ethical questions.
Because the work involved extracting and manipulating stem cells
derived from blastocysts (early embryos) and aborted fetuses,28 the research
raised important issues regarding the moral status of the embryos, aborted
fetuses, and the cells derived from them, as well as “questions about the
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interplay between private funding and public oversight of morally contested
research.”29 In recognition of, and in preparation for, the media frenzy and
public outcry that would almost certainly accompany public disclosure of
this research, Geron had created an independent Ethics Advisory Board
(EAB) in early 1998 to consult and give advice to the corporation on the
bioethical aspects of the research it was funding.30
The Geron EAB was made up of five individuals with health care ethics
experience and a range of philosophical and theological backgrounds.31 It
met over a period of months preceding the November 1998 announcement
to consider the ethical issues surrounding research on human embryonic
stem cells, and ultimately concluded that this type of research could be
conducted ethically.32 The EAB, however, did delineate a number of ethical
conditions for research using human embryonic stem cells.33 The EAB also
acknowledged the need for continued public discourse on such difficult
ethical issues as who should control the disposition of embryonic or fetal
tissue, the proper relationship between proprietary biotechnology
companies and ethics boards, and the role of consensus on contested moral
issues in a deeply pluralistic society.34
As expected, within weeks of publishing the data, Geron and the two
teams of scientists who had done the actual work were swept up into a
frenzied political, scientific, and public debate.35 One element of Geron’s
corporate response to questions raised about the ethics of human stem cell
research was to make available the Ethics Advisory Board report,36
presumably to illustrate the company’s responsible approach to research and
to help justify its decision to proceed with embryonic stem cell research.
Once the work of the Geron EAB became public, other biotechnology
corporations saw the potential utility of implementing this model, and
shortly thereafter, ACT commissioned its own independent bioethics board.
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B. The Advanced Cell Therapeutics Experience
ACT is a privately held biotechnology corporation located in Worcester,
Massachusetts; interestingly, its president and CEO is Michael West, the
founder of Geron.37 After leaving Geron in 1997, West moved to Advanced
Cell Therapeutics and proceeded to position it to compete directly with his
old company. Because Geron held the exclusive rights to the processes for
obtaining human stem cells from existing embryos and aborted fetuses,
West began looking for an alternative source of stem cells.38 He found that
alternative source through experiments involving the creation of cloned
human embryos from which scientists could derive human embryonic stem
cells.39
If Geron had been treading on morally unstable ground with its stem cell
research using existing embryos, ACT was diving headfirst into quicksand
in its attempt to clone human embryos. West was undoubtedly aware of
Geron’s Ethics Advisory Board, through his prior connection with that
company and because the Geron EAB’s workings and report had been made
public. Not surprisingly, ACT soon had its own private ethics advisory
board, staffed by individuals with experience in health care and bioethics.40
On November 25, 2001, ACT announced that it had successfully created
the world’s first cloned human embryo, setting off another firestorm of
media attention and raising additional ethical concerns.41 These flames
were fanned by public statements made by Glenn McGee, a philosopher and
assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics,
that he had resigned from ACT’s Ethics Advisory Board in October of
2000.42 His resignation had been prompted by an incident in which a
reporter had asked him to make a televised comment on an unnamed
biotechnology company that had cloned a wild gaur, an endangered species.
Professor McGee went on record to say that the company was
inappropriately “playing God,” only to discover later that ACT was the
company that had conducted the cloning research.43 ACT’s secretive
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nature, exemplified by its failure to disclose or discuss this work with the
EAB, was the final straw that led to McGee’s resignation.44
When Professor McGee went public with his concerns in the wake of
ACT’s announcement that it was beginning to experiment with cloning
human embryos, commentators began to raise questions about the ethics of
these private boards and the individuals who agreed to serve on them. This
was an absolutely fascinating development: the ethics advisory board model
for the private industry had created a crisis in ethics for the very profession
that held itself out to be experts on the subject—the bioethics community.45

IV. BIOETHICS IN THE BOARDROOM
Although corporate ethics advisory boards have received the most
attention, some companies have sought professional bioethics advice
without going through the process of creating their own ethics boards. For
example, the Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine, a private fertility
clinic in Norfolk, Virginia, consulted three separate panels of bioethics
experts before mixing eggs and sperm to create human embryos solely to
harvest their stem cells for experimentation.46 Because the Jones Institute
refused to name the panels that had approved its work, it was not clear who
had participated in the deliberations, where these panels had come from, or
whether this was a one-time consultation or a continuing relationship.47
Another mechanism used by corporations has been to seek counsel from an
individual bioethicist rather than a group of experts. That this is a common
occurrence has become apparent as bioethicists are increasingly pushed, as
a matter of professional ethics, to disclose their working and financial
relationships with corporations.48
Whether by bioethics advisory committee, outside panel, or individual
consultation, the biotechnology industry is now regularly bringing bioethics
into the boardroom. Some of the questions relevant to corporate ethics in
health care are whether this practice reflects a shift or maturation in
corporate culture—a concerted effort to create a “bioethical climate”49 that
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both supports and encourages bioethics discourse and deliberation—and
whether this practice has a beneficial effect on decision making within the
research enterprise.50 The answers to these questions requires a more indepth analysis of corporate motivation and the structural components of the
relationship between corporations and their bioethics consultants.
A. Corporate Motivation
The motivation question asks why corporations are choosing to bring
bioethicists into the corporate fold. Is it for the laudable goal of adding
bioethics-based analyses (which would include societal costs and benefits)
into the mix so that private corporate research agendas are not determined
solely on the bases of financial costs and benefits to the particular corporate
enterprise? In other words, are these companies making a sincere effort to
internalize bioethical theory and questioning, seeking guidance on novel
issues, so that bioethics reasoning becomes part of the corporate ethical
culture? Or, are bioethicists and ethics advisory boards merely intended as
window dressing? Are they merely public relations tools designed to
placate and pacify the public and the media, providing the appearance of
morality and concern for the larger looming social questions and lending
credibility to otherwise troubling research, while the corporations continue
their pursuit of purely profit-driven agendas?
When ACT’s cloning of human embryos caused a public stir, ACT did
not hesitate to justify its work on the basis of the Ethics Advisory Board’s
conclusion that the cloned embryos did not have the same moral standing as
conventional human embryos.51 Is this an example of a corporate enterprise
engaging in ethical research, or is the EAB just a public relations ploy?52
As is so often the case, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.
Motivation is always difficult to discern, and even more so when the actor
in question is a corporate entity, which may have a public face but multiple
layers of private interaction. Furthermore, corporations can operate with
mixed motives, and private profit-based motives sometimes align and
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coincide with larger societal interests. To some extent, we are left to infer
motive from the way in which corporations structure their relationships with
bioethics consultants.
B. Structural Aspects of the Bioethicist-Corporate Relationship
1. Objectivity and Independence
If the societal goals of bioethics consultation are to be met, it is critical
that the individuals reviewing the research operate with as much objectivity
and independence as possible. However, as a practical matter, how truly
independent can a private EAB be from the corporation that created it? Are
corporate EABs or individual bioethics consultants predisposed in favor of
their corporation’s research agendas?
The answers to these questions
depend in part on the criteria by which the bioethicists are chosen, the
existence of uniform standards for bioethics consultation, and the financial
arrangements between corporation and ethics advisor.
a. Membership Criteria
What are the qualities that a corporate sponsor should look for when
choosing the members of an ethics advisory board or hiring a bioethics
consultant? What constellation of knowledge, skills, experience, and
beliefs provides the ideal background for doing this kind of work? If a
corporation desires a robust debate, a critical review of research proposals
from a number of different perspectives, and a process wherein the hard
questions are asked and advisors are encouraged to be thoughtful and
comprehensive in their analyses and recommendations, the structure of the
advisory body should arguably mirror the size and complexity of the task.
This level of research review would call for perhaps ten to fifteen
individuals with wide-ranging experiences and a broad variety of
backgrounds and perspectives (for example, community activists,
philosophers, theologians, scientists, health care workers and consumers,
and lawyers).
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Because ethical consultation is an entirely voluntary process, there are no
rules or regulations regarding EAB membership. However, a useful
analogy exists between the EAB and another type of board, the Institutional
Review Board (IRB). By federal law, all research performed or funded by
the federal government that involves human subjects must be reviewed by
an IRB; the IRB’s purpose is to protect human subjects.53 Pursuant to the
federal regulations, all IRBs must have at least five members with varying
backgrounds, with at least one member having scientific expertise and at
least one with a nonscientific background. No IRB can consist entirely of
members of only one profession.54
The numbers for Geron’s and ACT’s EABs, however, are somewhat
lower and the heterogeneity appears to be considerably less. Geron’s EAB
had five members;55 ACT’s had nine.56 It is not at all unusual for
biotechnology corporations to hire only one ethicist to provide consultation
and review of its research proposals.57 Furthermore, it seems likely that
corporations “shop” for bioethicists who have previously taken positions
consonant with the research the corporation wishes to undertake. Advanced
Cell Therapeutics went so far as to allow one of the principal investigators
in its human embryo cloning research to sit on its EAB and participate in
the ethics review of that very same research.58 This is perhaps an extreme
example, but as Dr. Daniel Callahan59 remarked, “These companies are
smart enough to know that there are a variety of views on these subjects,
and with a little bit of asking or shopping around you can find a group that
will be congenial to what you are doing.”60 Of course, if corporations are
engaging in this kind of viewpoint cherry-picking, they are just following
the lead of our political leaders, who have done precisely the same thing
when setting up governmental bioethics advisory boards and
commissions.61
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b. Uniform Standards
Given that the choice of bioethics consultants may well be skewed in
favor of corporate research objectives, the application of uniform bioethics
standards, both procedural and substantive, in corporate bioethics
consulting would assist in ensuring the desired level of objectivity. This is
where a comparison to outside, independent auditors in the ordinary
corporate setting may be particularly useful. One of the protections of the
business auditing system is that outside auditors operate under a set of
nationally standardized and accepted accounting principles and procedures.
Unfortunately, within the discipline of bioethics, virtually everything is
contested: overarching theories, underlying principles, modes of analysis,
and the relevance of value systems, including religious beliefs. In fact, one
of the primary goals of bioethics as a discipline is to encourage people to
ask questions, to discuss, to educate themselves, and to look at these
contested issues from multiple perspectives.
This inherently nonstandardized approach makes it difficult to imagine that the analytical
framework could (or should) be agreed upon in order to provide protection
against corporate coercion and influence and to ensure objectivity on the
part of ethics consultants.
c. Financial Relationship
Another important determinant of objectivity and independence is the
nature of the financial relationship between the bioethicist and the
corporation. Some commentators have questioned whether it is ethical for
bioethicists to receive any compensation for this kind of work,62 and the
financial compensation issue is causing a schism within the bioethics
community. Positions run the gamut from essentially “we shouldn’t take a
penny for providing this advice”63 to “of course we should be well
compensated for our expertise.”64
If compensation is appropriate, and there is certainly a reasonable
argument that bioethicists should not be expected to work for free,65 then
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what level of compensation is large enough to adequately compensate ethics
board members for their time and expertise, but not so great as to render
them mere shills of the corporation? Members of Geron’s EAB received a
$1,000 honorarium for each scheduled meeting with staff and officers, but
they were not compensated for time spent researching and writing, and
members did not hold any stock in the corporation.66 The ACT advisory
board members set their own compensation at the outset; they chose $200
per day plus expenses for attending four quarterly meetings of the board,
with no additional compensation for time spent on research, telephone, or email conversations.67 Although these amounts seem relatively de minimis,
there are reports of ethics advisors to corporations making tens of thousands
of dollars per year.68
A task force on bioethics consultation proposed the following limits on
compensation: no contingency fees; the rate of compensation and the value
of any equity interest should not depend on the conclusions reached; the
compensation should not be so great that the consultant would be
embarrassed if the amount became known; and finally, the compensation
should not be large enough that the consultant comes to depend on the
income.69 Of course, the fact that the task force felt the need to propose
compensation guidelines reinforces the concern that some bioethicists are
making substantial amounts of money by providing consulting services to
biotechnology corporations, and perhaps compromising their professional
integrity in the process.70
2. Timing
With the remarkable rapidity with which this kind of science is
advancing, and the premium that the market places on being the first to do
something (with the concomitant race to the patent office), the timing issue
looms large. Given this emphasis on speed, how can a private ethics
advisory board or individual bioethics consultant take the time necessary to
educate, deliberate, and produce advice to the corporation that is reflective,
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thoughtful, and comprehensive? And yet, without an adequate time frame,
the deliberative process and ultimate work product are unquestionably
compromised.
The ethics review done by Geron’s EAB is a good illustration of the
timing problem. The ethics board, which was constituted in early 1998,
apparently began its work after the company’s research on human stem
cells was already well under way.71 Furthermore, the EAB statement of
ethical guidelines for research with human embryonic stem cells was not
drafted until September 1998 and was not finalized until late October, just a
few days before the November 5 publication in Science of Geron’s stem cell
breakthrough.72 At best, then, the EAB’s guidelines operated as an afterthe-fact ethics “stamp of approval” for the way Geron had already
conducted its research, rather than providing guidance and advice
beforehand. Furthermore, the incomplete nature of the bioethics analysis
contained within the report that explicated the guidelines was, to some
extent, a reflection of the relatively short time frame (several months)
within which the board had to work. 73
A cynical take on this timing would suggest that the Geron EAB was
intended to operate as little more than a public relations arm of the
corporation. However, this assessment is probably overly harsh. Geron and
its EAB should be evaluated within the context of the difficulties inherent in
trying to operate ahead of a scientific field that is advancing at light speed,
and the fact that EABs were just coming into existence in 1998. Still, as
one commentator remarked, it’s hard to imagine that the members of
Geron’s advisory board felt free to disapprove of research that had already
taken place and was on the verge of publication.74
In contrast, the ACT’s EAB seems to have performed under a more
reasonable time frame, which in theory would allow for more nuanced and
comprehensive bioethics debate and deliberation. Over a year before ACT
began its experiments to clone human embryos as a source for stem cells,
the corporation had put its EAB in place and worked with it to try to
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develop a responsible and ethical research plan.75 Of course, the validity of
ACT’s claim to responsible research was called into question by one-time
board member McGee’s allegations that the company had not made a full
disclosure of its research activities to the EAB.76
3. Corporate Accountability
The corporate accountability issue is the extent to which the corporation
is required to give effect to the bioethics consultant’s or board’s
recommendations. Interestingly, Michael West disclosed that when the
idea of establishing an ethics board first arose at Geron, the company
concluded that giving an ethics board the power to veto research projects
would undermine the corporation’s fiduciary obligations to its
shareholders.77 Hence the name “ethics advisory board.” In keeping with
this view, Karen Lebacqz, the chair of the Geron EAB, acknowledged that
the company was “perfectly at liberty to ignore all our advice.”78 West took
the same position once he became President and CEO at Advance Cell
Therapeutics, asserting that veto power over research directions rested
exclusively with the privately held corporation’s board of directors.79
However, just because corporations do not bind themselves to follow
recommendations or advice, it does not necessarily follow that there is no
accountability. According to members of ACT’s EAB, the company and its
researchers took the ethics review process seriously, adopting every single
one of the board’s recommendations on its human cloning research, even
when doing so slowed or impeded the research.80 The Ethics Advisory
Board postulated that ACT’s responsiveness may have flowed from respect
for the process it had set up, a genuine desire for guidance on novel
scientific and ethical issues, and/or the realization that board members could
embarrass ACT if its recommendations were ignored.81 Publicly traded
companies such as Geron may have an additional concern—that the public
will hold them accountable for disregarding ethics recommendations by
“voting with their feet.” However, the general public can only hold these
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companies accountable if it has access to the relevant information, which in
turn rests on the degree of confidentiality that surrounds the bioethics
consultation processes.
4. Transparency
Transparency in this context has two applications. The first is internal to
the corporation and depends on an array of factors: whether the ethics
consultants have access to all relevant information and to management and
research-level employees; whether EAB members are invited to attend
board of director meetings where research and development plans are
discussed in detail; whether the consultants’ questions are answered fully;
and whether the ethics board members feel free to have candid discussions
with corporate representatives. On this measure, the ACT board members
described a system of transparency and free access to corporate officers,
directors, and researchers.82
The other application for transparency is the extent to which the review
process and any conclusions or recommendations are disseminated to the
public, as opposed to being kept confidential within the corporation.83 Are
ethics board members free to talk openly and in public about the review
process, the conclusions, and any disagreements over the corporate research
direction? The chair of the Geron EAB revealed that ethics board members
were prohibited from publicly discussing the nature of a project that Geron
had wanted to fund but had then abandoned after the ethics board raised
objections to it.84 In contrast, although the ACT board members were
required to sign a confidentiality agreement as to “nonpublic information,”
the agreement also included that “nothing . . . shall impair or restrict the
right of any member of the Ethics Advisory Board to comment publicly,
speak or write concerning ethical issues,” provided that they didn’t disclose
non-public, technical information.85 Michael West, the CEO of ACT,
reassured the Ethics Advisory Board members that they would always have
the “power of the pen” and the freedom to speak out whenever the company
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ignored its advice.86 It is interesting to note, however, that ACT’s sitting
EAB members have, thus far, used the power of the pen only to praise the
company.87 Might this reflect the subtle but real danger that bioethicists
will refrain from criticizing their corporate partners out of a concern that “it
is a rare corporation that will continue to fund bioethicists who are
constantly and publicly criticizing corporate policy”?88
C. The Ethical Crisis Within the Bioethics Profession
What began as an issue of how to effectively bring bioethics into the
boardroom of biotechnology corporations has now turned into an ethical
crisis for the bioethics profession. The simple fact that the contact with
corporate culture that has occurred through EABs and individual
consultations has caused members of the profession to dispute whether
bioethicists can, consistent with professional ethics, provide compensated or
even uncompensated advice to corporations.
Within this debate there is certainly some common ground. For example,
most members of the profession would agree that the bioethicist’s first
responsibility is to the public interest; the legitimacy of the profession
comes directly from the fact that society has entrusted bioethics experts
with the role of providing oversight to highly contested, complex, and
potentially troubling scientific ventures.89 Virtually everyone would also
agree that serving clients whose primary interest is profit maximization
poses serious risks to the profession’s independence and integrity.90
Bioethicists differ radically, however, on the appropriate response to these
potential conflicts of interest, and their differences reflect a growing chasm
within the field of bioethics. Will bioethicists become advocates for the
corporate enterprise over time, working to facilitate and justify corporations
and their actions? Will the entire profession become seduced and corrupted
by corporate culture and the inducements it has to offer? In a very real
sense, individuals on both sides of this issue are fighting over the “soul” of
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the bioethics profession, and the arguments have been heartfelt and even
acrimonious.
1. Working from Within
Advocates who favor ethics consultation with the for-profit, private
sector assert that the profession has an obligation to promote the efforts of
the business community to incorporate bioethics into their decision-making
processes.91 In essence, they make an argument against the “ivory tower”
view of bioethics; they assert that ethical theories and principles can
influence the corporate sector only if bioethicists are willing to come down
out of their towers and engage within the business culture. For individuals
on this side of the battle line, the key requirement is that any consultation,
whether by group or individual, should be conducted in a responsible
fashion that maximizes the bioethicists’ objectivity, independence, and
impartiality.92
Of course, there are a number of different ways that this end might be
achieved. A task force composed of influential bioethicists approached the
problem by developing a set of voluntary guidelines for ethical bioethics
consultation.93 The guidelines address several of the structural issues
discussed earlier in this article such as the terms of the financial relationship
between consultant and corporation, the need for both internal transparency,
and at least some degree of public accountability.94 Other commentators
have focused on disclosure of corporate affiliations as the primary
mechanism for addressing conflicts of interest, although it is not always
clear precisely what bioethicists should disclose or to whom they should
disclose this information.95 Still others have suggested that although
consultation activities are not per se unethical, compensation from
corporations should either be limited (no stock options, no management
board positions, de minimis payments)96 or bioethicists should provide these
services for free.97 In response to this latter position, Professor Thomas
Donaldson used a market analysis to argue that the idea of the bioethics
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profession turning down compensation for consultation is downright “silly,”
and that the bioethics profession’s “profit motive should be civilized, not
destroyed.”98 He advocated the use of business ethics as a guide to the
ethics of bioethics consultation, suggesting that guidelines developed to
promote auditor independence in the accounting field can be applied equally
well to bioethicists receiving compensation for their advice.99 Other
approaches advocated by various commentators include the development of
uniform best practices for ethics advisory boards, communication across
EABs, and the development of private review bodies that are completely
external and advise several corporations rather than just one.100
2. Standing Above the Fray
Implicit throughout the various proposals described above is the
proposition that corporate bioethics consultation is appropriate and within
the bounds of professional ethics. Those who either vehemently disagree
with this position or have serious concerns begin by noting that bioethicists,
through their writing, teaching, consulting, and policymaking, have
historically served as overseers of the medical and scientific enterprise.101
The critical issue is whether the profession can maintain the integrity and
independence needed to function in this role if its members are being paid
or otherwise rewarded by the very entities whose activities they are
entrusted to monitor. As Professor Carl Elliott so eloquently puts it, what
happens when you “throw[] a bone to the watchdog?”102
Although bioethicists working within academia or the medical field are
regularly paid for their services, the concern is that working for a for-profit
corporation is fundamentally different. As Daniel Callahan explains, the
cultures of business and bioethics are radically different in their motives and
objectives, the interests they protect, and their moral subcultures.103 Unlike
hospitals, universities, and academic bioethics centers, corporations have a
direct financial interest in the opinions formed and the views expressed by
their hired bioethicists.104 Biotechnology companies also have a great deal
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of money to spend,105 and most of these consulting contracts do not come
with a guarantee of academic freedom.106 As a result, Professor Elliott
worries that “each corporate check cashed takes us one step closer to the
notion of ethics as a commodity, a series of canned lectures, white papers,
and consultation services to be purchased by the highest bidder.”107
Monetary compensation is not the only inducement that corporations
have to offer bioethics experts. Professor Laurie Zoloth suggests that the
profession ought to be equally concerned about other types of inducements,
those that can be termed “social capital.”108 Bioethicists who wish to
advance their careers naturally value and pursue activities that enhance their
professional reputations and increase the demand for their services,
opinions, and expertise. They are only human and the lure of national
fame—being quoted in the media, published in prestigious journals, named
to national bioethics panels—is a potent elixir.109 Corporate consultancies
are an important piece of this social capital, and even non-paying
consultancies can enhance a bioethicist’s reputation and cachet. The
potential conflict of interest is clear; it is simply not good business practice
for a biotechnology company to hire an ethics consultant who publicly
criticizes or calls for a halt to corporate research practices.110 All of this
taken together—the compromise to objectivity that can come from
identification with and allegiance to a corporate client, the lack of external
standards, the financial inducements, the seduction of status and fame—
creates a rather precarious basis for the societal trust that is so essential to
the field of bioethics and its practitioners.111
D. Corporate Responsibility in the Realm of Bioethics
The purpose of this article is not to solve the identity crisis within the
bioethics profession, but rather to point out that the discussion thus far is
surprisingly incomplete. What is fascinating about all of the soul-searching
is that no one has thought to suggest that corporations might bear some
primary responsibilities in this regard. Might biotechnology companies
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have an obligation to utilize bioethics services in a manner that maximizes
consultant objectivity and independence?
Should corporations be
responsible for creating an internal ethical climate in which these kinds of
consultations are taken seriously rather than used as public relations
window dressing? Should the issues raised regarding the structure of the
bioethicist-corporation relationship be of concern to business as well as
bioethics?
This is where interdisciplinary conversation is so helpful, and it returns
us to the power of Lynne Dallas’s conception of an ethical corporate
climate. The corporate and business voices are irrelevant to this
conversation only if one is willing to accept that the corporate form cannot
evolve; that corporations cannot be encouraged, expected, or required to
maintain and follow ethical standards; that corporations have no
responsibilities beyond those owed directly to their investors and
shareholders. Recent history, including the reaction to the Enron debacle,
suggests that society and legal scholars are increasingly unwilling to accept
these traditional premises.
This is not to say that the process of determining and directing corporate
responsibility in the area of bioethics consultation would be an easy one.
The federal government’s position thus far to either deny or provide only
very limited funding to embryo and stem cell research removes the
spending power basis for federal regulation of the private biotechnology
industry. In addition, much of the work in the wake of Enron’s collapse has
involved corporate responsibility in a context where it could be argued that
implementing ethical practices would actually increase profits and
shareholder value (or at least prevent bankruptcy). In the biotechnology
realm, we are facing a situation where a corporate decision to follow
bioethics advice and forego a particular line of research or pursue it in a
more ethically acceptable, but also more expensive, manner would likely
result in a reduction in profits and investor value.
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The reality, though, is that we are not talking about widgets here. The
corporate form is already an extremely complex moral and ethical playing
field, but that complexity is magnified when the substrates with which the
corporation works are the building blocks of life itself. There may come a
day when human embryos, stem cells, and individual genes are so divorced
from their traditional biological origins, so commodified, that they have lost
even their symbolic value. Until that day, it is not unreasonable to expect
corporate decision makers, despite the corporate profit-maximizing form, to
answer to constituencies beyond the usual shareholders and investors.
Bioethics is one mechanism by which societal values can be brought to bear
on the corporate enterprise, but only if the climate is right.
What might a “bioethical corporate climate” look like? According to
Dallas, the ethical climate of a corporation consists of the ethical meaning
that employees attach to organizational practices and procedures that in turn
reflect corporate norms and values.112 Perhaps the most important factor in
creating and maintaining an ethical environment is management’s
willingness to set the moral tone for the corporation.113 Officers and
directors can achieve this by adopting a values-based approach in decision
making,114 framing issues in ethical or moral terms when appropriate,115
permitting ethical standards to actually influence business decisions,116 and
appropriately managing conflicts of interest.117
When one transfers these concepts from corporations generally to the
biotechnology sector specifically, it becomes clear that many of the
problems with bioethics consultations—suspect corporate motivation,
conflicts of interest, lack of corporate accountability, insufficient public
transparency—could be remedied if biotechnology corporations were to
create a climate more hospitable to bioethical principles and process. In
fact, what was framed earlier as an identity crisis within bioethics could just
as easily be framed as a crisis of ethics within the biotechnology industry.
While this may seem like mere semantics, looking at the structure and
process of bioethics consultation as a matter of corporate responsibility as
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well as an issue for the bioethics profession greatly increases the likelihood
that meaningful structural reforms can be achieved. Solutions to many of
the problems that surround the bioethicist-corporation relationship will
require corporate initiative, or at least cooperation. Thus, it makes perfect
sense to view these issues from the additional perspective of corporate
responsibility, and to support the development of corporate climates that
will truly value and utilize the rich resources that the discipline of bioethics
has to offer.

V. CONCLUSION
In the words of one bioethicist, members of the bioethics profession, at
their best, “introduce the social[] implications for the future, the history of
past abuses, and the present considerations of justice,” they “pull the
narrative frame from the private view within the institution to the larger
world that surrounds the institution, a world of obligation, of suffering, of
injustice, and of potential,” and they “see the problem of conflict as a
radical opportunity, not an avoidable mistake.”118 Bioethicists “hold things
in tension—the reasonableness of a marketplace, the realpolitik of private
financing, the nature of social constraints of our health care funding, and the
aspirations of justice,” and they “unpack[] the narratives, the analysis of
truth claims, the interpretations of reality that divide by culture, class, race,
and religious tradition.”119
Given the high stakes involved in biotechnology research, especially in
the morally contested areas of embryo and stem cell research, and given the
societal value that bioethics discourse and discernment can bring to the
boardroom table, efforts to import bioethics into the business of
biotechnology are surely worth the struggle. We ought not be surprised that
the interface between bioethics and business cultures has the potential to
produce change, positive and negative, in both cultures. The challenge is to
continue to improve the model for that interaction; Professor Dallas’s work
on corporate ethics, which emphasizes corporate responsibility for creating
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a favorable ethical climate, provides a powerful tool for furthering societal
objectives within the for-profit biotechnology industry.
1
Annette E. Clark is Associate Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law.
This article grew out of a presentation given at the conference, “Corporate Ethics and
Governance in the Health Care Marketplace,” held at Seattle University School of Law,
February 27–28, 2004.
2
The scientific imperative can be thought of as a type of “manifest destiny,” whereby
individuals and institutions work to extend the boundaries of human knowledge, each
scientist adding his or her own small piece of knowledge to the ever-advancing tide.
3
See Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations
and their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate:The Psychology of Enron’s
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003).
4
SOURCE BOOK IN BIOETHICS 1 (Albert R. Jonsen et al. eds., 1998).
5
Id. (quoting 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS xxi (Warren T. Reich ed., 1995)).
6
Casuistry is a mode of pragmatic moral reasoning that, rather than relying on universal
principles, applies “case ethics,” with a particular focus on the factual similarities and
differences between cases. See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE
OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING 10–12 (1988).
7
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bioethicists Find Themselves the Ones Being Scrutinized,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at A1.
8
Id.
9
See Martin Körbling & Zeev Estrov, Adult Stem Cells for Tissue Repair—A New
Therapeutic Concept?, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 570 (2003). Adult stem cells are most
commonly isolated from bone marrow and peripheral blood. Id. Their usefulness in
tissue repair is currently unknown but is the focus of intense research efforts. See id. at
579.
10
See generally Irving L. Weissman, Stem Cells—Scientific, Medical, and Political
Issues, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1576 (2002) (describing stem cells, their nature, and their
uses).
11
Arthur Allen, God and Science, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2000, at W8.
12
Id.
13
Stephen S. Hall, The Recycled Generation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at 30.
14
Id.
15
Allen, supra note 11.
16
Rick Weiss, Bush Administration Order Halts Stem Cell Meeting, WASH. POST, Apr.
21, 2001, at A2.
17
Stem cell lines are created by isolating embryonic stem cells from the inner cell mass
of blastocysts and scientifically manipulating and culturing the stem cells so that they
will grow and divide continuously, thus providing a ready source of cells for
experimentation. John Gearhart, New Embryonic Stem-Cell Lines—More Is Better, 350
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1275, 1275 (2004). See generally Chad A. Cowan et al., Derivation
of Embryonic Stem-Cell Lines from Human Blastocysts, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1353
(2004) (describing this scientific process in more detail).

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

337

338 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

18

Rick Weiss, Promising More—and Less, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2001, at A1. This
limitation was an attempt by the administration to strike a middle ethical position,
whereby federal funds could be used to support stem cell research for the benefit of
humankind, but without federal complicity in causing further destruction of human
embryos for that purpose. Although President Bush asserted that sixty stem cell lines
would be available for federally funded research, see id., in reality only twenty-one cell
lines are currently listed in the National Institutes of Health (NIH) registry and are
available for research in the United States. George Q. Daley, Missed Opportunities in
Embryonic Stem-Cell Research, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 627, 627 (2004).
19
Rick Weiss, Bush Unveils Bioethics Council, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2002, at A21.
20
Mary Leonard, Panel Bush Named Rejects Full Ban on Cloning in Compromise,
Divided Members Urge 4-Year Delay, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 2002, at A2. For the full
report produced by the Council, see HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: THE
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2002).
21
See infra Part III.B.
22
See generally ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, CRAFTING A CLONING POLICY: FROM
DOLLY TO STEM CELLS (2002); CLONING AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN EMBRYO
RESEARCH (Paul Lauritzen ed., 2001); HUMAN CLONING, supra note 20 (discussing the
ethics of human cloning and embryo research).
23
Hall, supra note 13. West named his company Geron, which is Greek for “old
person,” and directed its resources to the exploration of the molecular causes of aging.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Marilynn Marchione, Ethical, Legal Questions Hardly Sway Scientist at Vanguard of
Human Cloning, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 5, 2002, at A1 (quoting Dr. Arthur
Caplan, director of the Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania).
26
Id. The University of Wisconsin and Johns Hopkins, where the actual work was done,
retained the patents on the research, but Geron received exclusive rights to the
commercial applications that flowed from the research. Id.
27
Geron Ethics Advisory Board, Research with Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Ethical
Considerations, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 31.
28
The stem cell lines developed by John Gearhart’s team at Johns Hopkins were derived
from the gonads of aborted fetuses at two months of gestation. The stem cell lines grown
by James Thomson’s group came from fourteen embryos donated anonymously by
patients who had undergone fertility treatments at the University of Wisconsin Hospital
in Madison. Allen, supra note 11.
29
Thomas B. Okarma, Human Primordial Stem Cells, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–
Apr. 1999, at 30.
30
Geron Ethics Advisory Board, supra note 27, at 31.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. The Geron EAB’s conditions for conducting human stem cell research were as
follows:
•
The blastocyst must be treated with the respect appropriate to early
human embryonic tissue.

CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE

The Ethics of Bioethics in the Biotechnology Industry

•

•
•
•
•

Women/couples donating blastocysts produced in the process of in
vitro fertilization must give full and informed consent for the use of
the blastocysts in research and in the development of cell lines from
that tissue.
The hES [human embryonic stem] research will not involve any
cloning for purposes of human reproduction, any transfer to a
uterus, or any creation of chimeras.
Acquisition and development of the feeder layer necessary for the
growth of hES cell lines in vitro must not violate accepted norms for
human or animal research.
All such research must be done in a context of concern for global
justice.
All such research should be approved by an independent Ethics
Advisory Board in addition to an Institutional Review Board.

Id. at 31–35.
34
Id. at 35.
35
See Allen, supra note 11.
36
For the complete report, which was made available by Geron through a symposium in
the Hastings Center Report, see supra note 27, at 30.
37
Hall, supra note 13. Mr. West left Geron after becoming disenchanted with the
company’s leadership and direction. Id.
38
Id.
39
See Rick Weiss, Firm Aims to Clone Embryos for Stem Cells, WASH. POST, July 12,
2001, at A1.
40
One stimulus to create the ACT ethics advisory board may have been the “publicrelations fiasco” that occurred in October 1988 when West invited the 48 Hours
newsmagazine to film work that involved fusing human cells and cow eggs to create
embryos for stem cell research. See Hall, supra note 13.
41
See, e.g., Seth Borenstein, U.S. Firm Clones Human Embryo; Religious, Political
Leaders Appalled; Cells Die Quickly, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 26, 2001, at A1.
See also Cathy Lynn Grossman, Furor Echoes the Questions on Stem Cells, USA
TODAY, Nov. 27, 2001, at D8; Human Embryo Cloning Criticized, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 26,
2001, at A1; Researchers Claim to Have Cloned Human Embryos, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
26, 2001, at A1; Rick Weiss, First Human Embryos are Cloned in U.S.; Private Lab
Seeks to Mine Stem Cells for Research, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2001, at A1.
42
Stolberg, supra note 7.
43
Id.
44
Rick Weiss, Cloning Firm Is Accused of Ignoring Its Ethics Board, WASH. POST, July
14, 2001, at A3.
45
See infra Part IV.C. (exploring this phenomenon in more detail).
46
Stolberg, supra note 7, at A1.
47
Id.
48
See Virginia A. Sharpe, Science, Bioethics, and the Public Interest: On the Need for
Transparency, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2002, at 23, 25 (recommending full
disclosure by bioethicists of all relevant outside affiliations, consultancies, and funding

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

339

340 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

sources on resumes, in biographical sketches, to university conflict of interest offices, to
the media, and in published and oral presentations).
49
By referring to a “bioethical climate,” I am building on Professor Dallas’s concept of
an ethical climate within corporations by applying it to the biotechnology setting. See
Dallas, supra note 3, at 22 (defining corporate ethical climate as “the ethical meaning
attached by employees to organizational standards, practices, and procedures, including
managerial behavior and reward systems that reflect corporate norms and values.”).
50
Professor Dallas makes the point that a corporation’s ethical climate is an important
determinant in employee decision making. Id. at 28.
51
See Weiss, supra note 41.
52
Not surprisingly, Professor Ronald Green, the chair of ACT’s EAB and director of the
Ethics Institute at Dartmouth College, argued in favor of the former view. He asserted
that the advisory board had imposed numerous conditions on the human embryo research,
including a requirement that women who wanted to be egg donors must have already had
at least one child, as a precaution against the unlikely event that the egg donation process
resulted in an inability to conceive in the future. Bryn Nelson, Human Cloning Ban
Urged, NEWSDAY, Nov. 27, 2001, at A8. Professor Glenn McGee, formerly a member of
the board, took the opposite view, stating, “It was very clear they were using their ethics
advisory board as a rubber stamp.” See Michael Hill, From Cloning Sheep . . . To
Cloning Humans, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 2, 2001, at F1. But see Ronald M. Green et al.,
Overseeing Research on Therapeutic Cloning: A Private Ethics Board Responds to Its
Critics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2002, at 27, 28 (disputing McGee’s
credibility on the basis that he had neither attended the advisory board’s meetings nor
participated in the months of work required to get the embryo cloning research program
up and running).
53
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2003).
54
45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a)–(c) (2003).
55
See Geron Ethics Advisory Board, supra note 27, at 31.
56
See Green et al., supra note 52, at 27.
57
The members of a task force on bioethics consulting reasoned that although a larger
group provides the benefit of diversity of viewpoints, individual consultation has the
advantage of a clearer result and greater speed. See Baruch Brody et al., Bioethics
Consultation in the Private Sector, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2002, at 14, 17.
58
See Weiss, supra note 44. Dr. Ann Kieffling, a Harvard professor and surgeon, both
sat on the EAB and interviewed and recruited egg donors for the embryo cloning
research. Dr. Kieffling denied that her dual roles constituted a conflict of interest. Id.
But many would probably disagree with her conclusion, this author included. Contrast
Dr. Kieffling’s position with the federal regulations governing IRBs, the boards that
review human subjects research. In these regulations, no IRB member may participate in
the IRB’s review of any project in which the member has a conflicting interest, except to
provide information to the IRB. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(e) (2003).
59
Dr. Callahan is the founder of the Hastings Center, the first institute in the country
devoted to ethics in medicine.
60
Stolberg, supra note 7.

CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE

The Ethics of Bioethics in the Biotechnology Industry

61

For example, the President’s Council on Bioethics, which President George W. Bush
established by executive order in 2001 to study issues including embryo and stem cell
research, cloning, and human genetics, was criticized on the ground that it was stacked
with conservative thinkers who had taken public positions in opposition to research using
human embryos. See Rick Weiss, supra note 19. Those charges were renewed when two
of the council’s most outspoken proponents of research on human embryos were
summarily replaced by individuals whose views were reputedly more in line with those
of President Bush and Leon Kass, the council’s director. Weiss, Bush Ejects Two from
Bioethics Council; Charges Renew Criticism That the President Puts Politics Ahead of
Science, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2004, at A6. Dr. Elizabeth Blackburn, a scientist and
moral philosopher, was one of the two individuals who were replaced. She asserted that
the change in membership reflected a strong ideological shift in the council and was part
of the current administration’s pattern of manipulating scientific research for political
ends. See Elizabeth Blackburn, Bioethics and the Political Distortion of Biomedical
Science, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1379, 1379–1380 (2004). But see Leon Kass, We Don’t
Play Politics with Science, WASH. POST., Mar. 3, 2004, at A27 (vehemently refuting
charges that the change in the council’s membership was ideologically or politically
driven). See generally Robert Steinbrook, Science, Politics, and Federal Advisory
Committees, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1454 (2004) (further articulating the debate
surrounding politics and bioethics). Lest anyone think this is purely a Republican
phenomenon, opponents of embryo research asserted that the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission (NBAC) under President Clinton’s Democratic administration
didn’t contain a single member strongly opposed to research on embryos. See Allen,
supra note 11 (quoting one critic of NBAC as stating, “The basic function of these panels
seems to be to articulate reasons for what the people who appointed them already wanted
to do.”).
62
See, e.g., Carl Elliott, Throwing a Bone to the Watchdog, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 9–11. See also Daniel Callahan, Doing Good and Doing Well,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 19, 20–21 (“Bioethics was born financially
naked and will be better if it stays that way.”).
63
See Callahan, supra note 62, at 20.
64
See Brody et al., supra note 57, at 15.
65
See id. (asserting that affluent, for-profit corporate clients are not the appropriate
recipients of pro bono bioethics consultations).
66
Stolberg, supra note 7; Geron Ethics Advisory Board, supra note 27, at 36 n.25.
67
Green et al., supra note 52, at 28–29; see also Carl T. Hall, Untangling Biotech Issues,
S.F. CHRON., Dec. 3, 2001, at A6.
68
See Nell Boyce & David E. Kaplan, And Now, Ethics for Sale?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 30, 2001, at 18. For example, Dr. Arthur Caplan has served on several ethics
advisory boards, including that of Celera Genomics, which compensates him for his
services annually in the form of company stock, which he then converts to cash and gives
to his Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania. Stolberg, supra note 7. Dr.
Caplan reported that one year, the converted stock was worth $100,000. Id.

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

341

342 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

69

Brody et al., supra note 57, at 18–19. The task force was convened by the American
Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the American Society of Law, Medicine and
Ethics. Id. at 14.
70
In an interesting twist, harsh critics of the task force’s report expressed concern about
the authors’ motives and objectivity because, although they disclosed that eight of the ten
authors engaged in for-profit bioethics consultation, none of the authors disclosed the
amounts of compensation or the identities of their corporate affiliates. See Stuart J.
Youngner & Robert Arnold, Who Will Watch the Watchers?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May–June 2002, at 21, 21–22. To which, the task force authors claimed a right to
privacy on the matter of compensation. See Brody et al., The Task Force Responds,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2002, at 22, 23.
71
Carol A. Tauer, Private Ethics Boards and Public Debate, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 43. Working backward from the date of the publication in Science,
Professor Tauer concluded that virtually all of Geron’s scientific research had been
completed before the EAB issued its ethical guidelines. Id.
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., id. at 44 (taking the report to task for, among other things, failing to
distinguish between the moral status of the embryo and that of the derived embryonic
stem cells); see also Lori P. Knowles, Property, Progeny, and Patents, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 38, 40 (pointing out the inconsistencies in the report’s
position that commercializing embryos is wrong, yet condoning corporate profit-taking
from stem cells derived by destroying those embryos); Glenn McGee & Arthur L.
Caplan, What’s in the Dish?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 36, 37–38
(critiquing the report’s use of embryonic and fetal development to attach moral status to
the resultant stem cells); Lisa Sowle Cahill, The New Biotech World Order, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 45, 46–47 (praising Geron and its EAB for putting
issues of genetic justice and access on the table, but suggesting that the report would have
benefited from a fuller analysis of distributive justice, including notions of the common
good and communitarian ethics).
74
See Tauer, supra note 71, at 43.
75
See Weiss, supra note 39. For example, the plan provided that women who were
recruited as egg donors had to be fully informed that they would not benefit financially
and that their eggs would be used for cloning embryos, and egg donors were sought only
in areas not served by fertility clinics to avoid competing for eggs that might otherwise be
donated to infertile couples for implantation. The company also hired bodyguards and
installed video cameras to protect against theft of the cloned embryos by someone
wanting to attempt to implant them into a woman’s uterus. Id.
76
See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.
77
Hall, supra note 13.
78
Id.
79
See Green et al., supra note 52, at 29.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 31–32.
82
See id. at 29.

CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE

The Ethics of Bioethics in the Biotechnology Industry

83

See generally Gladys B. White, Foresight, Insight, Oversight, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 41 (discussing transparency).
84
Hall, supra note 13.
85
See Green et al., supra note 52, at 29. The non-public information that was to be kept
confidential was evidently defined narrowly, leaving board members to discuss publicly
the scientific policies or practices that the board was evaluating. See id.
86
Id.
87
There are a number of possible bases on which the EAB members could have
criticized the company. These include ACT’s decision to publish the results of its
cloning experiments in November 2001 even though the cloned embryos did not develop
sufficiently to be able to extract stem cells (arguably a failed experiment) and the
financially driven decision to publish in a new and relatively unknown online scientific
journal, with special media exclusives to enhance the hype. See Human Embryo Cloning
Criticized, supra note 41.
88
Elliott, supra note 62, at 11.
89
See, e.g., Sharpe, supra note 48, at 24–25 (suggesting that bioethicists’ first duty is to
the public interest); see also Laurie Zoloth & Gregory Kaebnick, Seeing the Duties to All,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 15, 18 (stating that bioethicists’ primary
allegiance must be to “an informed, democratic civil polity”); Callahan, supra note 62, at
20 (stating that bioethicists’ only motive should be “to help others, or society more
broadly, make good moral judgments.”).
90
See, e.g., Brody et al., supra note 57, at 15; Youngner & Arnold, supra note 70, at 21;
Sharpe, supra note 48, at 25; Elliott, supra note 62, at 10–11.
91
See Brody et al., supra note 57, at 15.
92
Id.
93
See id. at 15–19. The task force was convened by the American Society for Bioethics
and Humanities and the American Society for Law, Medicine & Ethics. Id. at 14.
94
Id.
95
See, e.g., Brody et al., supra note 57, at 18 (asserting that disclosure is a matter to be
negotiated between the bioethics consultant and the corporation); see also Youngner &
Arnold, supra note 70, at 21–22 (stating that at a minimum, consultants must disclose
identity of corporation(s) and amount of compensation); Sharpe, supra note 48, at 25–26
(advocating full disclosure of consultative relationships to university administrators, on
resumes, on personal and professional Web sites, to the media, and in published and oral
presentations). The idea behind disclosure requirements is that they help others evaluate
the motives, objectivity, and trustworthiness of an author or speaker. Youngner &
Arnold, supra note 70, at 21–22. Some commentators worry, however, that disclosure
requirements might actually make matters worse by implicitly encouraging bioethicists to
accept conflicts of interest under the rationale that officially sanctioned disclosure
somehow remedies all conflict problems. See Gregory E. Kaebnick, Is Disclosure
Helpful?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 3 (announcing new financial
interest disclosure requirements for all authors publishing with the Hastings Center
Report).
96
Zoloth & Kaebnick, supra note 89, at 18.
97
See Callahan, supra note 62, at 20.

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

343

344 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

98

See Thomas Donaldson, The Business Ethics of Bioethics Consulting, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 12, 14. Professor Donaldson is with the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania.
99
Id. Consistent with the guidelines for accounting auditors, he suggests that before
entering into a consultation contract, bioethicists should seek to identify threats to their
independence, the effectiveness of potential safeguards, and the acceptable level of risk to
independence. Id. at 13. The threat to consultant or auditor independence is deemed to
be high when the consultant is self-interested, audits his or her own work, acts as an
advocate or has a close relationship with the client, and/or is subject to coercion by the
client or another interested party. Id. at 13–14. The usefulness of Professor Donaldson’s
analogy is rather severely undercut by the fact that auditors are subject to uniform and
independent accounting standards, a safeguard that is not present in bioethics consulting.
See supra Part IV.B.1.b.
100
See Green et al., supra note 52, at 32–33.
101
See Elliott, supra note 62, at 9–10; Zoloth & Kaebnick, supra note 89, at 15–17.
102
Elliott, supra note 62, at 9. Professor Elliott teaches philosophy at the Center for
Bioethics at the University of Minnesota.
103
Callahan, supra note 62, at 20.
104
Id. at 10.
105
Compensation can take the form of consulting fees, stock options, gifts, and honoraria.
Id. at 9.
106
Id. at 11.
107
Id.
108
See Zoloth & Kaebnick, supra note 89, at 17.
109
Id. See also Youngner & Arnold, supra note 70, at 21 (arguing that bioethicists are
influenced both by the desire to do good and the desire to do well, in the form of money,
power, and prestige).
110
Elliott, supra note 62, at 11.
111
Sharpe, supra note 48, at 25.
112
Dallas, supra note 3, at 22.
113
Id. at 40.
114
Id. at 18–19.
115
Id. at 11.
116
Id. at 55–56.
117
Id. at 65.
118
Zoloth & Kaebnick, supra note 89, at 15.
119
Zoloth & Kaebnick, supra note 89, at 16.

CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE

